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there is some other soul?
(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?
(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?
(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?
(7) Whether by means of an accident?
(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]
Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?
Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.
Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to