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After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.
Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:
(1) The multitude or distinction of things.
(2) Their inequality.
(3) The unity of the world.
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]
Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A. 4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q. 44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter