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Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good."
_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists;