Continued in: Next
any comparison. But to _reason,_ properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q. 79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
Reply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
QUESTION 84
HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS
BENEATH IT (In Eight Articles)