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Reply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.
QUESTION 80
OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (In Two Articles)
Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?
(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?
FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 1]
Whether the Appetite Is a Special Power of the Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
Obj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each